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Congestion pricing of Canada’s four largest airports would save between seventy-two 
and one-hundred-five million dollars annually. Social cost of each aircraft movement 
would decrease by several hundred dollars at Toronto and Vancouver, and by about fifty 
dollars at Calgary and Montreal. Toronto currently experiences this congestion in spite of 
its slot control system. Congestion fees would be less than current weight-based landing 
fees on average. At projected traffic growth rates, social costs of landings and takeoffs 
would remain below current levels for at least five years—postponing the need for 
additional capacity. A stochastic bottleneck model indicates these substantial welfare 
gains regardless of whether dominant airlines internalize their self-imposed delays. This 
paper reports equilibrium congestion fee schedules by time of day and calculates 
equilibrium traffic rates, queuing delays, layover times, and connection times. 
Keywords:   airport   congestion   pricing,   stochastic   queuing,   bottleneck   model,   slot 
constraints. 
(JEL R4, H2, L5, L9)
THE  LEADING  AIRPORTS  in the Canadian National Airport System (NAS) have undergone rapid 
development and substantial growth in passenger enplanements and aircraft movements since the federal 
government transferred their operation to local airport authorities during the 1990’s. Toronto, Vancouver, 
Calgary, and Montreal have all substantially modernized their airport terminals, runways, control towers, 
taxiways, and ground transportation to meet growing demand. Toronto, Vancouver, and Calgary envision 
construction of additional runways sometime during the next twenty years. All four airports will approach 
their maximal capacities at their current sites by then. 
Toronto's L. B. Pearson International airport is a particularly interesting case, being the largest and 
most congested airport in the NAS. The airport has among the highest weight-based landing fees in the 
world ($34.65 per 1000 kg maximum take off weight), and also imposes high Airport Improvement Fees 
per enplaning ($20) and connecting ($8) passengers. Toronto is the only airport in the NAS currently 
subject to slot constraints,
2  although the next three largest airports potentially are candidates for slot 
constraints in the coming decades. As shown below, Toronto experiences significant traffic peaking in spite 
of its slot constraints, with aircraft imposing around $1000 of external congestion on each other under the 
current pricing system. Whatever effect Toronto's existing slot reservation system may have, it leaves the 
airport with substantial amounts of congestion. The results below support the common criticisms that 
Toronto is overbuilt, overpriced, and inefficient in using its existing capacity. The results cast doubt on the 
efficacy of administered slot reservation systems as congestion mitigation policies.This study uses the stochastic bottleneck model of Daniel [10, 11] and Daniel and Harback [12, 
13] with data on the airports’ scheduled arrival and departure times to calculate equilibrium traffic patterns 
under weight-based fees and optimal congestion fees. Congestion pricing schedules are calculated under 
the alternative assumptions that dominant airlines do or do not internalize their self-imposed congestion, 
because this issue is unresolved in the literature. Daniel and Harback find that dominant airlines do not 
internalize self-imposed delays at most US airports, while Brueckner [6] and Mayer and Sinai [22] find that 
they do. These alternative assumptions regarding internalization result in significantly different congestion-
fee schedules, but congestion pricing substantially reduces the social costs of delay under either hypothesis. 
The results also show that making more efficient use of existing capacity by spreading peak demand would 
postpone the need for constructing additional runway capacity by at least five years. Equilibrium traffic 
rates, delays, marginal congestion levels, price schedules, and welfare effects of congestion pricing at 
Canada’s four largest airports are reported for both specifications of the model. 
In bottleneck models, the purpose of congestion pricing is to reduce delays by smoothing the flow 
of traffic so that it does not greatly exceed capacity during peak periods. Welfare gains result from more 
efficient scheduling of existing traffic to reduce delays, not from eliminating some traffic by charging high 
tolls. In the standard bottleneck model, total demand is fixed while traffic shifts between periods to 
establish the equilibrium. Most empirical models of congestion pricing, however, specify traffic rates as 
functions of contemporaneous travel costs, without allowing traffic to shift between periods. The purpose 
of congestion pricing in such models is to reduce delay by “tolling off” traffic that exceeds socially 
efficient levels. Canadian airports already impose unusually high charges per enplaned passengers (CEP) in 
the form of weight-based landing fees and airport improvement fees. Current landing fees alone are higher 
than optimal congestion fees would be on average. Imposing congestion pricing while rolling back other 
fees could therefore leave full costs (fees and time costs) of aircraft landings and takeoffs unchanged. 
While this cost-neutral implementation of congestion pricing would not toll off any more demand, the 
results in this study show that significant welfare gains would accrue from peak spreading. 
The traffic data presented below exhibit rapid periodic peaking associated with hub-and-spoke 
airline operations. Hub-and-spoke airlines schedule flights in banks of arriving and departing flights that 
cluster around passenger interchange periods to facilitate connections and reduce layover times. The 
resulting traffic patterns are significantly different from the gradual morning and afternoon peaking that 
was common before widespread adoption of hub-and-spoke networks. When airport traffic peaks gradually, 
the fee schedules also vary gradually over time. When airports have rapid traffic fluctuations associated 
with hub-and-spoke operations, however, fee schedules must fluctuate rapidly to encourage some aircraft to 
use off-peak capacity. Most “real world” congestion mitigation proposals are based on models that ignore 
this rapid peaking of traffic. In these proposals, either variation in congestion fees over time is inadequate, 
or  variation in the number of slots by time periods is inadequate for their prices to vary sufficiently. 
Whenever price variation is inadequate, queues develop to equilibrate supply and demand.
2Unlike standard congestion pricing models, the bottleneck model has endogenously-peaking 
traffic and explicitly accounts for trade-offs between queuing delay, layover time, and connection time. 
Traffic rates and queues peak because airlines balance costs of layover delays or missed connections 
against costs of queuing delays. While some traffic peaking is necessary to optimize connection and 
layover time, there are two potential sources of excessive peaking that cause inefficiencies. First, non-hub 
aircraft ignore the delays they impose on the hub airline (and each other) when they schedule aircraft 
during the hub's flight banks. Second, the hub airline may schedule its own aircraft more closely together 
than it otherwise would (i.e., ignore self-imposed delays) to exclude non-hub aircraft from operating during 
its flight banks. This article demonstrates that peak spreading produces significant welfare gains by 
reducing inefficiencies from either (or both) source(s). To obtain these welfare gains, however, congestion 
prices must appropriately reflect the dynamic nature of the problem by imposing time-varying fees that 
have peaking patterns similar to existing traffic rates and queues. Equilibrium congestion fees provide 
alternative incentives that (largely) replace the role of queuing costs in establishing equilibrium. Optimal 
congestion fees reduce queuing by spreading out traffic rates so that they do not exceed the service rates.
Slot reservation systems like those used in Toronto and the European Union only attempt to 
manage demand by hour or half-hour intervals, and consequently lack the precision to prevent congestion 
delays caused by rapid hub-and-spoke traffic peaking. Toronto is a level 3 coordinated airport that follows 
the International Air Transport Association's Worldwide Scheduling Guidelines, 2005, 12
th Edition [19] 
(WSG)  for administration of its slot reservation system. Level 3 airports have demand that exceeds 
capacity, are unable to restrain demand through voluntarily agreements, and therefore require aircraft to 
obtain slot reservations to operate. A “slot” authorizes an aircraft to land or takeoff at the airport on a 
particular day and time, usually designated by an hour or half-hour time window. Slots are typically 
allocated in series of five or more consecutive days. The fundamental principles of the WSG slot allocation 
system are to preserve existing usage patterns (subject to a use-it-or-lose-it rule), to limit slot trading to 
one-for-one exchanges (no sales), to prevent “confiscation” of slots from incumbents for redistribution to 
new entrants, and to limit slot allocations for new entrants (if at all) to a fraction of new capacity. Twice a 
year, over 300 airlines worldwide submit Slot Clearance Requests to about 160 airport slot coordinators to 
substantiate their previous slot usage. After slot coordinators make preliminary slot allocations, over 900 
representatives of airports and airlines meet at three-day bi-annual Worldwide Slot Conferences to engage 
in bilateral one-for-one slot exchange negotiations (see, Gillen, Hendrikssen, et al., [16]). Additional one-
for-one exchanges, but not sales, may occur following the conferences. This process must overcome an 
overwhelming distributional problem that the value of slots depends on combining them with other slots. 
Airlines must match landing slots with appropriately timed takeoff slots. They must obtain groups of slots 
to permit banks of arrivals and departures. They must pair slots with appropriately timed slots at the origin 
or destination airport. They must obtain sequences of slots to support regularly scheduled service with the 
appropriate frequency. Toronto alone has around 100,000 slots to allocate at each slot conference. Any slot 
allocation system has to solve a combinatorial optimization problem of enormous dimensionality.
3This paper focuses on congestion pricing rather than slot allocations as a solution to airport 
congestion because the empirical results demonstrate that Toronto's slot system does not regulate aircraft 
operating times with sufficient precision to eliminate substantial amounts of delay. Slots must have wide 
time windows to provide them with flexibility, facilitate their exchange, simplify their combination with 
other slots, and reduce the dimensionality of the scheduling problem. Optimizing delay would require more 
specific slot windows that grant authority to operate within a moving time window around a particular 
minute (say fifteen minutes on either side), but this would also greatly increase transaction, administration, 
and compliance costs. Instead, sets of slots have the same hourly or half-hourly windows to make them 
more fungible. Consequently, slot constrained airports like Toronto have busy and slack periods within 
each slot window, resulting in peaking similar to non-slotted airports.
3 
Proponents of slot allocations systems often overlook the complexity of administering slot 
reservations and the likelihood that they will fail to eliminate large amounts of delay. Slot auctions and slot 
markets are also administratively complex, relatively inflexible, and subject to high transaction costs. In 
addition, slot reservation systems may raise entry barriers, facilitate concentration, and increase market 
power. Congestion pricing, on the other hand, conveys all the necessary information about external costs 
needed to optimize scheduling while preserving flexibility and freedom of entry. The free-market allocation 
system in the US ensures open access to airports on a first-come first-served basis. Weight-based landing 
fees achieve equilibrium of supply and demand using a combination of constant prices and time-varying 
waiting times. Markets clear based on adjustments of arrival rates and queuing times without the high 
transaction costs required to administer slot allocation systems. The stochastic bottleneck model used here 
is essentially a means of replacing waiting time in a queue with marginal cost pricing. Setting the correct 
price requires determination of marginal social costs based on aircraft operating costs, passenger time 
values, observed traffic rates, and the dynamics of the queuing system. The queuing model provides 
analytical expressions for the additional delays imposed on other aircraft for any given traffic pattern. The 
market can adjust to the resulting time-varying fees just as it currently adjusts to time-varying queuing 
costs. 
Pricing operations at marginal cost and letting the market adjust accordingly does not necessarily 
require anticipating equilibrium traffic patterns or prices in advance. Price variation would gradually take 
over the role of queuing time in clearing the market. Slowly phasing in congestion pricing would allow 
traffic rates to adjust gradually as progressively more of aircrafts' marginal social costs are included in the 
fees. As congestion fees approach equilibrium levels, queuing time would diminish. In the paper below, 
computational methods solve the stochastic bottleneck model to demonstrate what equilibrium traffic 
patterns, queues, and fee schedules should look like at Canadian airports. In practice, however, marginal 
cost prices can be determined analytically for any given traffic pattern, while letting the market determine 
demand responses. The costs of additional delays are reasonably straight forward to determine. Aircraft 
costs and passenger time values are currently determined for a variety of other purposes; for example, in 
cost benefit analyses to determine optimal airport capacities. Daniel and Harback [12] validates the 
4stochastic bottleneck model by closely replicating the actual queuing patterns of twenty-seven US airports 
with a variety of traffic patterns. Calculating the appropriate fees is vastly simpler than administering 
combinatorial slot auctions or the WSG slot allocation system.
The next section reviews the literature on congestion pricing, internalization of delay, the current 
slot system, and slot auction and trading systems. Section 3 presents the stochastic bottleneck model while 
deferring the analytical solutions for marginal social delay times to the Appendix. Section 4 discusses the 
traffic data and explains the parameterizations of the model. Section 5 illustrates the rapid peaking created 
by hub-and-spoke airline operations and presents the main results of the paper including the equilibrium 
traffic, queuing, and pricing schedules for the four airports. It also presents the welfare improvements 
resulting from congestion pricing and changes in congestion levels given the projected growth in airport 
traffic over the next twenty years. The paper concludes with a discussion of policy implications based on 
the results.
The literature
Relatively few articles in the literature on airport congestion pricing attempt to calculate 
equilibrium fee schedules for actual airports. The literature focuses on theoretical pricing models, pricing of 
stylized networks, and (most recently) the internalization debate. Carlin and Park [9] estimate external 
congestion levels for New York’s LaGuardia airport circa 1967. Their model assumes that each arrival 
imposes delays equal to its service time (the time elapsed between consecutive aircraft touchdowns) on 
every subsequent arrival until the landing queue clears. This approach implicitly assumes a deterministic 
queuing system similar to those of deterministic bottleneck models. Their model uses data on traffic rates 
that vary by hour. Koopman [21] develops a stochastic queuing model to calculate delays at New York’s 
J. F. Kennedy airport circa 1970. His model and data also use hourly traffic rates. Carlin and Park and 
Koopman model traffic patterns as exogenous, so they only estimate the congestion that aircraft impose or 
experience in the weight-based-fee cases, not the equilibrium congestion-pricing cases. 
Borins [5] estimates equilibrium congestion fees at Toronto (Malton) International Airport for 
actual 1975 traffic and forecast traffic levels into the 1980's. He fits constant elasticity demand functions to 
determine demand on routes with different stage lengths and times of operation. The model also includes 
terminal and ground congestion. Full travel price includes ground access time, terminal time, runway time, 
and whatever fee is assessed. His model has four periods of the day: morning and evening peaks with mid-
day and night-time lulls. Cross elasticities of demand allow for shifting between time periods, but not flight 
distances. His congestion function is based on a (static) steady state queuing model for each of the four 
periods. Borins estimates congestion fees of about $30 off peak and $150 to $200 during peak periods. His 
welfare analysis indicates that congestion pricing postpones new capacity requirements by about five years 
and that Malton is a better airport site than Pickering, the alternative site under consideration at the time. 
The morning and afternoon peaking pattern with gradual traffic variation is essential to Borins' justification 
for using static queuing models to determine delays in each period. This approach is reasonable for airport 
5traffic in the 1960's and 1970's before the proliferation of hub-and-spoke networks, but today's traffic has 
much more frequent peaking and more rapid fluctuations. Borins [5] is apparently the only previously 
published academically study that calculates actual congestion prices for Canadian airports. 
Morrison [23] and Winston and Morrison [24] calculate airport delays, congestion prices, optimal 
capacities, and welfare effects from hypothetical congestion pricing at major US airports. They estimate 
delay times by hour as functions of the hourly number of aircraft landing and taking off, the type of aircraft, 
the number of runways, and the air-traffic control expenditures at each airport. They model airport demand 
as a function of hourly congestion prices and delay costs. Welfare gains accrue largely from tolling off 
aircraft that are unwilling to pay the full social costs of their operations. Their model does not include 
changes in layover delays or connection times that result when flights shift to less preferred periods. 
The airline industry has changed significantly since Borins, Winston, and Morrison's studies in 
ways that make their models less applicable today. Current data show that hub-and-spoke operations 
produce traffic patterns that typically fluctuate greatly during any given hour or half hour. Consequently, 
steady state queuing models and regression models with delays as functions of (half) hourly volume-to-
capacity ratios no longer capture airport delay patterns adequately (see, Daniel and Pahwa [14]). Modeling 
current airport delay patterns requires structural models with state-dependent queuing systems and 
endogenous traffic rates that adjust continuously (see also, Arnott, et al. [4]).
Vickrey [27] and Arnott, et al. [3, 4] develop bottleneck models in which the timing of traffic 
adjusts endogenously to minimize the sum of travelers’ schedule and congestion delay costs. They apply 
their models to rush-hour commuting, but the models also apply to hub airports where many aircraft arrive 
and depart through runway bottlenecks that prevent all aircraft from operating at precisely the beginning or 
ending of the hub airlines’ passenger interchange periods. These standard bottleneck models, however, 
have deterministic queues that are more appropriate for highway congestion where each vehicle is an 
infinitesimal part of traffic rather than airport congestion where each vehicle is non-negligible.
Earlier queuing models like Koopman’s [21] have simple models of exogenous airport demand, 
while providing sophisticated probabilistic models of delays. Morrison [23] and Winston and Morrison [24] 
have credible models of endogenous airport demand, but their delay models are more suited to gradual 
traffic fluctuations experienced by airports before the proliferation of hub-and-spoke airline networks. This 
paper applies the model of Daniel [10] that combines stochastic queuing theory (Koopman, [21], Omosigho 
and Worthington, [25], and Oum, et al., [26]) with a bottleneck model (Vickrey, [27] and Arnott, et 
al. [3, 4]). The queuing model captures the stochastic nature of arrivals, departures, and queues, that is an 
essential element of airport capacity missing from deterministic bottleneck models. The bottleneck model 
provides endogenous adjustment of time-dependent traffic rates. The model is similar to Henderson's [18] 
highway bottleneck model with flow-congestion in that optimal pricing lengthens peak periods and does 
not eliminate all congestion, whereas in Vickrey [27] and Arnott, et al. [3, 4] pricing does not change the 
duration of peak periods and it completely eliminates congestion. The model used here is more applicable 
to airports than Henderson’s model because it has stochastic queuing rather than flow congestion. 
6This article implements the same model that Daniel and Harback [13] applied to price twenty-
seven major US airports. That paper estimated existing delays by regressing flight (or taxi-out) duration of 
aircraft with different origins (or destinations) on dichotomous variables for minute of arrival (or departure) 
at the airport. The coefficients of the dichotomous variables represent the component of flight time due to 
queuing at the runway that varies with the time of day. Daniel and Harback also estimated the values of 
layover and connection time relative to queuing time using the basic equilibrium condition of the 
bottleneck model. Their results demonstrated that the stochastic bottleneck model accurately replicates 
estimated queuing patterns as the no-fee equilibria for a wide variety of airports. Unfortunately, equivalent 
data on flight duration and operating times in Canada is not available for estimating current queuing 
patterns or time values. Implementing the bottleneck model, however, only requires data on the number of 
hub airline flights participating in each passenger exchange and the number and time distribution of non 
hub aircraft. This study calibrates the model's time values using Daniel and Harback's estimates from 
Minneapolis-St. Paul airport (MSP). Instead of comparing equilibrium queues against estimated queues, 
this study validates equilibrium traffic patterns against the scheduled traffic data. While estimated queuing 
patterns are unavailable, no-fee equilibrium queuing patterns are comparable to those implied by the 
stochastic queuing model applied to the actual scheduled traffic rates.
This article compares bottleneck equilibria when dominant airlines either internalize or ignore 
their self-imposed delays. Daniel [10] notes that dominant airlines might internalize their self-imposed 
delays. He performs a series of empirical tests using tower log data from MSP airport that largely rejects 
the internalization hypothesis. In spite of this, many subsequent researchers find the theoretical argument 
that dominant airlines should internalize their self-imposed delays to be more convincing. Brueckner [6] 
and Mayer and Sinai [22] both find weak but statistically significant evidence that airport delays decrease 
as airport concentration increases. They argue that this relationship is due to internalization by dominant 
airlines and that congestion fees should reflect internalization of self-imposed delays. Brueckner proposes 
that dominant airline fees should be inversely proportional to their share of aircraft operations at the airport. 
Daniel and Harback [12] conduct specification tests similar to Daniel [10], for twenty-seven major hub 
airports and find that dominant airlines do not internalize self-imposed delays at most major U.S. airports, 
but they may internalize delays at some airports. Brueckner and Van Dender [6] shows that conventional 
congestion  models can  generate  internalizing or non-internalizing behavior,  depending  on whether 
dominant   airlines   follow   Nash   or   Stackelberg   strategies.   This   article   remains   neutral   about   the 
internalization issue by calculating congestion fees and welfare effects for both specifications. The results 
illustrate how traffic patterns and price schedules differ depending on these behavioral assumptions.
This paper primarily focuses on pricing to alleviate congestion. An interesting empirical result, 
however, is that Toronto's slot reservation system fails to eliminate a substantial amount of congestion. 
Toronto, Europe, and the US currently implement administered slot allocations rather than market-based 
slot allocations. Gillen, Henriksson, et al. [16] recommends that slots at Toronto (and any NAS airports 
subject to future slot controls) be auctioned in bundles with slots expiring after a fixed period. Slots would 
7be resalable. Jones,  Holder,  et al. [20] evaluates  similar  proposals  for  Europe  in their  study  assessing the 
effects of different slot allocation schemes for the European Union. Whalen, Carlton, et al., [32] proposes 
that JFK, LaGuardia, and Newark airports annually auction ten percent of their slots, with slots subject to 
expiration and re-auctioning every ten years. Slots would be freely marketable between auctions. Brueckner 
and Van Dender [7] and Verhoef [31] develop models in which such slot auctions with subsequent 
marketability achieve optimal allocations of slots. Verhoef's results limit optimality to situations in which 
airlines do not have market power. Bruekner's model explicitly assumes airlines have no market power.
Auctions of marketable slots would undoubtedly improve slot allocation systems relative to the 
WSG approach, but they do not address the conflict between long slot windows necessary for marketability 
and precise slot windows necessary for optimal peak spreading. Whalen, Carlton, et al., [32] explicitly 
mentions the problem of demand peaking within the slot periods due to imprecise specification of operating 
times, but recommends half-hour slot windows to facilitate auctions and sales by reducing the number of 
potential slot bundles. They suggest revisiting the possibility quarter-hour slot windows if peaking persists. 
Having continuously varying congestion prices with open access to airports avoids this problem. Airlines 
already solve the problem of scheduling their operations at large numbers of airports subject to rapidly 
varying queuing times, but these queuing times provide the wrong signals for social optimality because 
they do not include congestion externalities. Congestion pricing replaces continuously varying queuing 
costs with continuously varying prices. Whalen, Carlton, et al., [32] dismisses congestion pricing because 
they argue market clearing prices are difficult to determine, but  Jones,  Holder,  et  al. [20] details  the 
enormous  complexities  of  combinatorial auctions that Whalen, Carlton, et al. favor. The remainder of this 
paper demonstrates how to calculate time varying marginal social costs of aircraft operations at Canadian 
airports. The concluding section discusses how to implement congestion pricing by dynamically adjusting 
prices in response to observed changes in demand without having to anticipate equilibrium traffic patterns 
or prices.
The model
This paper applies the stochastic bottleneck model described in Daniel and Harback [12] to 
calculate equilibria with weight-based fees and congestion prices at Canada’s four leading airports. This 
section describes the model, while Appendix A presents its mathematical specification.
The standard deterministic bottleneck model describes the endogenous timing of trips in response 
to delays or fees as vehicles flow through bottlenecks with limited capacities that prevent travelers from all 
arriving at their destinations at precisely their preferred times. Some travelers must complete their trips 
early and others must complete their trips late. A deterministic queue develops at the bottleneck whenever 
the traffic rate exceeds the bottleneck capacity. Travelers have time values associated with queuing time, 
early trip-completion time, and late trip-completion time. By assumption (and without loss of generality), 
the time required to traverse the bottleneck is the only time needed to travel between origins and 
destinations. The equilibrium requires that arrival rates at the bottleneck adjust endogenously so that the 
8rates of change in queuing-, early-, and late-time costs sum to zero throughout the busy period, for identical 
travelers. Increasing queuing-time costs just offset decreasing early-time costs for early travelers, and 
decreasing queuing-time costs just offset increasing late-time costs for late travelers. The standard 
application of this model is to the morning commute to work, but the model is also applicable to hub airport 
traffic. Airlines want their aircraft to exchange passengers quickly and reliably with one another at their 
hub airports. Runway capacity prevents aircraft from all landing or taking off at precisely the same time. 
Some aircraft arrive early with little queuing but have long layovers, some arrive close to the exchange 
time have shorter layovers but longer queuing delays, and some arrive late as queues are decreasing but risk 
missing connections. Airlines adjust their schedules so that in equilibrium no aircraft can reduce the sum of 
its layover, queuing, and connection costs by changing its intended time of operation. Aircraft with the 
same time values and operating-time preferences must have the same total cost in equilibrium.
Several modifications to the standard model are necessary to realistically describe hub-and-spoke 
airport traffic. First, there are significant random shocks to aircraft operating times. Travel time is affected, 
for example, by headwinds and tailwinds, other weather conditions, and directness or circuity of flight 
paths. Aircraft schedulers should use the probability distribution on random shocks to operating times to 
calculate expected layover and connection time costs, rather than assuming aircraft always operate at their 
intended times as in the standard deterministic model. The distribution of these random shocks is modeled 
using observations from Daniel and Harback [13] on differences between actual aircraft-operating times 
and mean operating times per flight number over the sample period at MSP airport. 
Random aircraft operating times also affect the queuing system, particularly when each aircraft is 
a non-negligible unit of traffic (unlike automobiles). Stochastic queuing theory treats traffic rates and queue 
lengths probabilistically. Arrivals at the queue follow Poisson distributions with time-varying expected 
traffic rates. Discrete probability distributions on queue lengths describe the states of the queuing systems. 
The rate of change in the state of the queuing system depends on both the current traffic rate and the current 
state of the queue. Daniel and Pahwa [14] show that stochastic queuing systems are more successful than 
deterministic queuing systems at modeling the evolution of airport queues over time. The specific queuing 
model used here is classified as M(t)/d/s/K; indicating that it has time-dependent Poisson traffic rates, a 
deterministic service rate, a maximum queue size, and multiple servers (runways). This specification is 
chosen for its realism and computational simplicity. 
Daniel [10] combined the bottleneck model with a stochastic queuing system to endogenize traffic 
rates. The stochastic bottleneck model has the same basic structure as the deterministic version, but its 
equilibrium requires that traffic rates adjust until the expected rates of change in layover, connection, and 
queuing time costs sum to zero throughout the busy period. In equilibrium, there is no further incentive for 
airlines to change the intended operating times of any aircraft. In the model, as in reality, airlines schedule 
aircraft without knowing the random shocks their aircraft will experience or the precise state of the queue at 
the times of service. The airline calculates expected layover, connection, and queuing times by using the 
distribution of random shocks and the distribution of queue lengths. Deterministic and stochastic queuing 
9models can behave very differently. Stochastic queues have positive expected lengths whenever the traffic 
rate is positive, whereas deterministic queues do not develop as long as the traffic rate is at or below the 
service rate. In the priced deterministic equilibrium, therefore, traffic rates exactly equal the service rate 
throughout the entire busy period, with no queue developing. The length of the busy period is constant. In 
the stochastic bottleneck model, however, airlines always trade off layover, connection, and queuing times. 
Some queuing delay is unavoidable. Mayer and Sinai [22] refer to this unavoidable delay by saying, 
“… not all airport delays are evil.” Congestion pricing in the stochastic bottleneck model distinguishes 
between good (efficient) queuing delays that are required to optimize layover and connection times and evil 
(inefficient) queuing delays caused by externalities. Pricing only seeks to eliminate the evil external delays.
Congestion pricing in the stochastic bottleneck model eliminates inefficiencies from purely 
external delays by spreading out traffic and reducing peak traffic rates. The Nash-dominant airline 
specification assumes that dominant airlines already internalize the additional delays their aircraft impose 
on each other. They schedule aircraft to minimize their combined costs of any fees and layover, connection, 
and queuing times, taking other aircraft schedules as given. Their first-order necessary conditions consist of 
an equation for each of their aircraft that includes the marginal costs it experiences directly plus its indirect 
effect on marginal costs of its other aircraft. The airport authority sets Nash-dominant airline fees equal to 
the additional delays that they impose on other airlines' aircraft. Non-dominant aircraft fees equal the 
additional delays that they impose on one another and on dominant aircraft. In this specification, welfare 
gains result primarily from shifting non-dominant aircraft out of the dominant airlines’ peak-traffic periods. 
The   Stackelberg-dominant   airline   specification,   on   the   other   hand,   ignores   self-imposed 
congestion in unpriced equilibria because airlines realize that the aggregate traffic patterns and congestion 
levels are the same in any bottleneck equilibrium regardless of when dominant airlines schedule their own 
aircraft. Any attempt by dominant airlines to internalize delays by spreading out their traffic simply results 
in trading places with non-dominant aircraft. Stackelberg dominant airlines schedule their aircraft to 
minimize their individual aircraft's own costs of any fees and layover, connection, and queuing times, 
subject to the best responses of non dominant aircraft. Their first-order necessary conditions consist of an 
equation for each aircraft that includes the marginal costs it experiences directly but assumes it has no 
marginal effect on its airline's other aircraft because they experience the same delay in any Stackelberg 
equilibrium. The airport authority sets Stackelberg-dominant airline fees equal to the additional delays their 
aircraft impose on other airlines' aircraft and on one another. The non-dominant aircraft fees are the same 
as before. 
If  the  same layover and connection time values were applied to both specifications, then the 
specifications' unpriced equilibrium traffic patterns would be different because of different internalization 
behavior, while the specifications' priced-equilibrium traffic patterns would be identical because they fully 
internalize delay in both cases. The observed (unpriced) traffic patterns, however, are (necessarily) the 
same, so the specifications must have different layover and connection time values to approximate this 
observed traffic pattern. It follows that the priced traffic patterns of the two specifications will be different. 
10In both specifications, pricing produces welfare gains from shifting non-dominant traffic out of the 
dominant airlines’ flight banks. The non-internalizing specification, additionally, has excessive delays that 
dominant aircraft impose on each other in the unpriced equilibrium. Congestion prices reduce these self-
imposed delays by enabling dominant airlines to optimally spread out their traffic while discouraging non-
dominant aircraft from shifting back into the peak periods. While the Nash specification treats dominant 
airlines’ self-imposed delays as part of the optimal tradeoff between layover, connection, and queuing 
times, the Stackelberg specification treats these delays as though they are external and should be priced. 
The Stackelberg specification has more external delay but the Nash specification has higher values of 
layover and connection times. It is indeterminate which specification generates higher welfare gains from 
congestion pricing. This explains how it is possible to obtain the empirical result that the internalizing 
specification generates higher welfare gains than the non-internalizing result.
While the model provides closed-form, analytical expressions for the probability distributions on 
queues and expected marginal delays, it requires computational methods to find the equilibrium traffic 
rates. For any initial schedule of operations, the model can calculate the full cost (layover-, connection-, 
and queuing-time costs plus whatever fee is imposed) of scheduling aircraft of a particular type during any 
service interval. Different aircraft types allow for different values of layover, connection, and queuing 
times and different distributions of preferred arrival times. Dominant hub airlines and their code affiliates 
have a single preferred operating time for each arrival or departure bank that is the start or end of the 
passenger   interchange   period.   All   non-dominant   aircraft   have   uniformly   distributed   operating-time 
preferences within each bank. The computational algorithm iteratively reschedules dominant aircraft from 
periods with above average and increasing expected costs to periods with below average and decreasing 
expected costs until all aircraft of a given type have the same (minimum) cost. Depending on the 
specification, these expected costs exclude or include the additional delays imposed on other dominant 
aircraft. The algorithm iteratively reschedules non-dominant aircraft until the first differences of their 
expected costs sum to zero for all aircraft. Aircraft categories include: major dominant, regional (code 
sharing) dominant, major non-dominant, regional non-dominant, and other (mostly unscheduled general 
aviation). Each category has its own time values that account for different aircraft sizes.
Although the stochastic model is more complex computationally than the deterministic model, the 
models have essentially the same structure with the substitution of  expected  layover, connection, and 
queuing times for their corresponding deterministic values. The stochastic queuing system takes two 
additional parameters: namely the number of servers (runways) and a maximal queue size. Airport data 
determines the number of runways. The maximal queue size is necessary purely for computational purposes 
and is large enough that there is infinitesimal probability of reaching it. Both the deterministic and 
stochastic models require parameters for the length of service intervals. Traffic rates are endogenous in 
both cases; the deterministic system has only two traffic rates, early and late, while the stochastic queuing 
system has continuously varying traffic rates. Consequently, the stochastic model has no more free 
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its probabilistic queuing system.
The Data
The data on scheduled and actual operating times comes from airline web sites that report all 
scheduled aircraft movements at the four airports on April 1, 2008. They report scheduled and actual times 
of operation, the origin or destination airports, and the arrival or departure gates. Transport Canada’s 
Aircraft Movement Statistics, Annual Report 2005 [29] and the 2007 Annual Reports of the respective 
airports provide data on unscheduled operations. Aircraft Movement Statistics does not report the times of 
operation, but it tabulates aircraft by types, weights, and operators. By assumption, unscheduled aircraft are 
distributed proportionately to the size of each flight bank (including dominant and non dominant aircraft). 
Their preferred operating times are uniformly distributed within each bank. Non dominant scheduled 
aircraft are also assumed to have uniformly-distributed preferred operating times within bank periods. 
Dominant aircraft are assumed to have a common most preferred operating time at the start or end of 
passenger interchange period. The bottleneck model determines the start or end of the interchange as the 
time when the aircraft experiencing the longest queue completes service.
This is the best data that is publicly available, but it is inadequate to statistically estimate actual 
queuing patterns or the values of layover and connection time relative to queuing time. Daniel and Harback 
[13], however, estimates time values for a wide variety of US airports and finds that the values are 
reasonably consistent for similar types of airports. Time values for MSP airport provide the basis for those 
used here, because MSP is reasonably similar in size and location to the Canadian airports. These time 
values determine the rates (slopes) of increase and decrease of the traffic peaks, so comparing equilibrium 
traffic patterns with scheduled traffic peaks provides an alternative validation of the time values and the 
model's ability to replicate actual traffic patterns. Estimates of actual queuing patterns throughout the day 
would also be useful for calibrating service rates to more precisely replicate actual queuing patterns. This 
study uses service rates from the airports' Master Plans [1, 8, 17, 30] that report the maximal number of 
aircraft movements they can perform per hour under various conditions. Airports use these service rates to 
determine future capacity requirements. Daniel and Harback’s work with US data verifies that these are 
good estimates of the queuing systems' service rate parameters. The stochastic queuing model accurately 
replicates Daniel and Harback’s estimates of actual queues. Service rate elasticities are reported below to 
indicate the sensitivity of the results with respect to service rates. Aside from problems estimating the time 
values and actual queuing times, the schedule data is entirely adequate to determine the equilibrium traffic 
patterns, queues, and congestion fees. 
Economic Values for FAA Investment and Regulatory Decisions, a Guide, Table 3-4, p 3-7 [15] 
(aka, Critical Values) provides aircraft operating-cost data to quantify Daniel and Harback's estimates of 
layover- and connection-time values relative to queuing-time values.  Critical Values  specifies the 
methodology and economic values to be used in investment and regulatory decisions of the FAA. Similar 
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Cost Analysis Guide, Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, [28]). Critical Values compiles the operating 
costs of aircraft by seating capacity, body type (narrow or wide), and number and type of engines as 
reported by the airlines on FAA Form 41. The data include numbers of aircraft of each type, passenger 
capacity, load factor, crew size, and fuel consumption. Different variable costs of aircraft operation account 
for different rates of fuel consumption while queuing in the air versus on the ground. The passenger time 
value is $28.50 per passenger hour. The average aircraft and crew have values per block hour of $1245 on 
the ground and $2096 in the air. Average passenger capacity is 157 and average load factor is 72% of 
capacity, giving a passenger value per block hour of $3233. Since these values vary nearly proportionately 
with aircraft size, they can be scaled to represent the queuing-time value of the average aircraft for each 
airline group at each airport as given in Transport Canada's  Aircraft Movement Statistics, 2005  [29]. 
Finally, values of layover and connection times are the aircraft queuing-time values multiplied by the 
layover- and connection-time regression coefficients from Daniel and Harback [12] for MSP airport.
4 The 
exchange rate between US and Canadian dollars at the time of the traffic observations, April 1, 2008, was 
very close to one, so no exchange-rate conversion is necessary.
The Results
Figures 1 and 2 compare the model's equilibrium arrival rates with the actual scheduled arrival 
times   at   Toronto,   Vancouver,   Calgary,   and   Montreal   for   the   non-internalizing   and   internalizing 
specifications.
5 The corresponding information for departures is shown in Appendix B, Figures B.1 and 
B.2. The observed traffic patterns, shown in lighter gray, illustrate the rapid fluctuations associated with 
operation of hub-and-spoke networks. Precise data on scheduling is clearly necessary to describe the extent 
of this peaking. Aggregation by hour or half-hour would eliminate most traffic fluctuation. Traffic at 
Toronto peaks about every half hour, with traffic rates varying from nearly zero to well above the service 
rate during almost every bank. Existing slot constraints obviously do not eliminate this peaking, but the 
constraints may cause more and smaller flight banks by limiting the number of operations within each slot 
window. If slot constraints are binding on the number of aircraft in the banks, then dominant airlines must 
prefer larger banks with lower layover costs but more queuing time. Slot constraints may actually increase 
social costs by preventing efficiently sized flight banks. Vancouver is almost as congested as Toronto per 
aircraft, but has two-thirds as much traffic. It does not have slot constraints and has about half as many 
banks. Its traffic pattern is also typical of hub-and-spoke operations, with rapid traffic fluctuations ranging 
from zero to above capacity within half-hour intervals. Similar observations apply to Calgary and 
Montreal, but they both have less than half Toronto's traffic. Calgary has two dominant airlines and 
therefore more banks than Vancouver or Montreal.
 The actual traffic data is highly consistent with the bottleneck model. The modeled traffic peaks, 
plotted in black, all have similar structure and timing as the actual scheduled traffic patterns. The shapes of 
traffic peaks depend on costs of layover and connection time relative to queuing time, the distribution of 
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from MSP, are typical of hub airports and produce traffic peaks similar to actual peaks at the Canadian 
Airports. Minor differences between the actual and modeled traffic peaks result in part from airlines 
reporting their scheduled operating times rounded to five or ten minute values, introducing some spikes and 
pits in the schedule data. Traffic rates would be smoother for data on rates of arrival at the queues averaged 
over several days, but this data is unavailable in Canada. The timing of the modeled traffic peaks depends 
on the time of dominant aircrafts' most preferred operating time in each bank. The bottleneck equilibrium 
requires that the aircraft with the longest queuing delay must complete service exactly at its most preferred 
time. These times are calculated for each bank as the time of the maximal queue plus the waiting time 
required to complete service. Preferred operating times for non hub aircraft are uniformly distributed over 
the bank. The number of aircraft in each bank is simply the number of operations preformed between the 
valleys (minimum traffic rates) on either side of the peak. The service rates determine the heights at which 
traffic rates plateau. Roughly speaking, unpriced traffic rates tend to level off close to the service rates. 
The model fits Toronto and Vancouver's traffic particularly well, as their traffic has the clearest 
hub-and-spoke bank structure. Toronto has many more banks than the other airports, possibly due to slot 
constraints, but the structure of the peaks is still highly consistent with the model. Toronto may also have 
more banks because it has more international traffic than any other Canadian airport and separates aircraft 
into sets of banks serving domestic, European, and US markets. Toronto's traffic clearly illustrates that slot 
constraints as currently administered do not eliminate demand peaking. Calgary has the second most banks 
due to having two dominant airlines, Air Canada and WestJet. Calgary's banks are less regularly spaced 
and crowd against each other. Daniel and Harback [13] found similar patterns at US airports with multiple 
dominant carriers such as Boston, Chicago, Dallas-Fort Worth, Newark, and others. Montreal has the 
weakest hub among the four airports. Its traffic peaks are the least distinct, but still show regular peaks and 
valleys. 
The model’s unpriced bottleneck equilibria that use the correct specification of internalizing 
behavior should match the scheduled traffic patterns best. The two specifications use different estimates of 
time values because the rate at which aircraft trade off layover and connection time for queuing time 
depends on whether queuing time includes indirect (imposed on other aircraft) delays in addition to direct 
(experienced by the aircraft) delays. Precise statistical tests to determine the correct specification require 
data on actual operating times that are unavailable for Canada, but such tests for US airports generally 
favor the atomistic specification. Casual comparison of traffic patterns at each of the Canadian airports 
does not appear to clearly favor either specification.
Figures 3 to 6 illustrate the non-internalizing daily traffic patterns, queue lengths, and congestion 
levels with and without congestion pricing for each of the airports. Figures 7 to 10 illustrate the same 
information for the internalizing case. The top panels of each figure show the modeled traffic patterns 
before and after imposition of the congestion prices. Traffic rates flatten out under congestion pricing, 
spreading peak rates into periods between peaks. Peak spreading is more evident for the non-internalizing 
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internalizing cases require higher layover and delay values to create the same degree of peaking when 
airlines internalize their self-imposed delays. For both specifications, unpriced traffic rates peak at about 
the service rate, causing stochastic queues to grow rapidly. The service rates for Toronto, Vancouver, 
Calgary, and Montreal are 1.25, 0.73, 0.59, and 0.50 aircraft per minute. By internalizing the high costs of 
extra delay that aircraft operating near the peak impose on others, congestion pricing shifts operations away 
from the peaks. Relatively small reductions in peak traffic can significantly reduce delays because expected 
queues increase at increasing rates as traffic rates approach the service rates.
The second panel of each figure illustrates the change in expected queue lengths resulting from 
congestion pricing. In the non-internalizing cases, peak queue levels under congestion pricing are roughly 
half the unpriced levels, but they decrease less rapidly at the edges of the peaks. In the internalizing cases, 
the reduction in queuing is not as dramatic but peak queuing levels are clearly reduced. None of these 
airports is highly congested at this time, but the qualitative characteristics of the queues remain similar as 
daily traffic volumes and congestion increase. Note that queuing is not completely eliminated by pricing in 
the stochastic bottleneck equilibrium because any positive traffic rate necessarily causes some expected 
queuing. This is different from the deterministic bottleneck model where traffic rates at or below the 
service rates cause no congestion. The internalizing specification has less opportunity to reduce queues 
because there is less uninternalized delay in the unpriced equilibrium. The changes in queuing delay times 
are quantified below. 
In the bottom panel of each figure, the unpriced congestion levels indicate the marginal delay that 
an operation imposes on other aircraft under the current weight-based pricing system. The priced 
congestion levels are the optimal equilibrium congestion fee schedules as functions of the time of 
operation. For the non-internalizing specification, there is a common fee structure that should be imposed 
both dominant and non dominant aircraft in the priced equilibria. For the internalizing specification, the 
graphs depict the ideal (internalizing) fee structures for each dominant and non-dominant aircraft type. For 
the non-internalizing case, the unpriced external congestion levels are typically many times higher than the 
equilibrium congestion fees because traffic has not adjusted to internalize congestion. Treating traffic rates 
endogenously demonstrates how dramatically congestion pricing decreases congestion levels in the non-
internalizing case. For the internalizing specification, the difference between unpriced and priced external 
congestion is much smaller. Dominant airlines already internalize their self-imposed congestion, so there is 
less external congestion for pricing to internalize. Assuming internalization of self-imposed delays by 
dominant airlines, the ideal congestion prices charge non-dominant aircraft for congestion imposed on all 
other aircraft, while they charge dominant airlines only for congestion imposed on other airlines’ aircraft. 
Depending on market shares, dominant airline fees can be much lower than non-dominant fees. 
The airports' fee structures are qualitatively similar. They increase and decrease almost linearly 
over time, and reach their peaks just before the beginning of each interchange period. The fees fall to zero 
between  peaks   provided  that  the interchange   periods  are  sufficiently  separated   from  one another 
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that trends up and down with the diurnal variation in demand (Toronto). The dominant airlines’ ideal fees 
in the internalizing case are lower than the non-internalizing fees and appear out of phase with their traffic 
peaks. These fees are lowest in the center of the banks and relatively higher at the edges because external 
congestion is highest where non-dominant aircraft operate. Calgary’s fee schedule is somewhat more 
erratic than the others because it has two airlines (Air Canada and Westjet) with separate bank schedules.
The highest congestion fees are higher than current weight-based landing fees, but as shown 
below, the average full costs (including time costs) of aircraft operations under congestion pricing are 
generally less than those under weight-based fees. Higher peak fees offset lower layover or connection 
costs, leading to constant costs over the busy periods. The fees must vary over time to reduce inefficient 
peaking of the queues. Many “congestion pricing” proposals attempt to “simplify” the fee structures by 
assigning flat fee surcharges over the morning and evening peak periods. Flat fees, while simple, do not 
address the causes of inefficient demand peaking and queuing. Toronto illustrates that slot constraints have 
a similar problem. The slot windows are evidently not precise enough (or inadequately enforced) to prevent 
substantial peaking of the traffic within the windows. Slot constraints may succeed in producing smaller, 
more frequent traffic peaks, but they cannot prevent the traffic from peaking with the same pattern as 
unpriced bottleneck equilibrium. The fee schedules proposed here vary nearly linearly over time as 
functions of when aircraft join the landing or takeoff queues. These linear fee schedules are simple enough 
for the airlines to comprehend and are not unduly costly for airports to administer. 
Tables 1 and 2 report the quantitative effects of congestion pricing for the non-internalizing and 
internalizing specifications at the four airports. The tables categorize aircraft by type, including; dominant 
airlines and their code-affiliated aircraft, all other scheduled aircraft, unscheduled commercial aircraft, and 
unscheduled private aircraft (if any). The first column of Table 1 shows the number of aircraft that land at 
the airport during the day. Toronto, Vancouver, Calgary, and Montreal are the largest Canadian airports by 
number of aircraft movements (landings and takeoffs) in 2008. Winnipeg International is the next largest 
airport in the National Airport System with about sixty percent as much traffic as Montreal. This paper 
focuses on the four largest airports in the NAS because they are the only ones with appreciable congestion 
levels. Toronto has by far the most aircraft movements with 656 pairs of landings and takeoffs. Vancouver 
has 446, Calgary has 314, and Montreal has 285. The number of operations varies seasonally with about 
20% more in summer and 20% less in winter. Toronto has successfully shifted nearly all noncommercial 
traffic to reliever airports.
The second column of Table 1 shows the approximate weight-based landing fee on average for 
each airline group based on the distribution of aircraft weights reported in Transport Canada’s Aircraft 
Movement Statistics, 2005  [29]. Canadian airport revenues come primarily from landing fees, general 
terminal fees, airport improvement fees, parking fees, and concessions and rentals. Toronto’s landing fee is 
among the highest in the world
6 ($34.65/tonne MTOW)
7 and is much higher than those of Vancouver 
($3.24 to 4.86)
8, Calgary ($4.14 to $7.38)
9, and Montreal ($13, estimated).
10  Toronto also has airport 
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improvement fee is $15 per originating passenger and Calgary and Montreal both charge $20 per 
originating passenger.
11 Air Canada and WestJet have higher proportions of domestic and regional aircraft 
than other scheduled service, resulting in lower weight-based fees on average. The size of Toronto's 
average weight-based fee, about $3600, is controversial and arguably due to excessive infrastructure and/or 
high land rents charged by the federal government. Montreal's average fee, $1000, is also high relative to 
other North American airports, while Vancouver and Calgary charge about $400 on average, which is 
closer to normal. Unlike US airports, Canadian airports are not subsidized by the Federal Government.
The third column of Table 1 shows the average congestion fees for each airline group. Average 
congestion fees are generally lower than current weight-based fees, except for those of some unscheduled 
aircraft. The average congestion fee for Air Canada and other scheduled aircraft at Toronto is just under 
$900, while fees for unscheduled aircraft average about $500 because they shift further to the edges of the 
traffic peaks. At Vancouver, scheduled aircraft fees average about $460, while unscheduled aircraft pay 
about $180 on average. Scheduled aircraft at Calgary and Montreal pay around $200 and unscheduled 
aircraft about half that much. Comparing these monetary costs of weight-based and congestion fees ignores 
changes in layover, connection, and queuing time costs. 
The full costs of fees and time appear in columns four and five. Imposition of congestion pricing 
has a large effect at Toronto because it has such high weight-based fees. For scheduled aircraft, full costs 
fall by over $3000 on average, while unscheduled aircraft pay about $100 more. The effect on full costs for 
scheduled aircraft is smaller at Vancouver, decreasing about $200, while the change in unscheduled aircraft 
costs is about the same. Most aircraft at Calgary and Montreal experience several hundred dollar decreases 
in full costs. Own-price elasticities of demand with respect to landing and takeoff costs should be small 
because these costs are typically less than five percent of total flight costs. Cross-price elasticities of 
demand are very difficult to estimate, but are unlikely to be significantly greater than the own-price 
elasticities. It is reasonable to treat demand for airports as fixed, because the elasticities are small and 
airports can compensate for changes in full cost by adjusting other airport fees, such as terminal fees and 
airport improvement fees. Congestion pricing can be implemented in a cost-neutral way.
Columns six and seven show expected queuing times under weight-based pricing and congestion 
pricing. Again, this comparison includes only part of the change in delay by excluding layover and 
connection time, but queuing delays are particularly important because they are the most unnecessarily 
expensive. At Toronto and Vancouver, average queuing delays for scheduled aircraft fall from nearly four 
minutes to just over two. Average queuing times at Calgary and Montreal decrease by one to one-half 
minutes. None of the airports is highly congested at this time, so reductions in average queues are modest. 
Peak queuing levels at the airports, however, would decline from more than five minutes to close to two 
except at Calgary where peak queues are currently only about 3.5 minutes. As traffic increases over time, 
congestion increases rapidly and all four airports face significant congestion within the next twenty years. 
Traffic growth and capacity are addressed later in this section. 
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airport. Column eight shows the change in direct time costs resulting from congestion pricing, net of the 
changes in fees. There is no unique way to apportion the social savings among aircraft, but this column 
illustrates that scheduled aircraft at all four airports have lower time costs, while the unscheduled aircraft 
have increased time costs because they shift further from their preferred operating times. Changes in fees 
are zero-sum transfers between airlines and airports, so there is a net social gain resulting from the time 
savings. Dead weight loss from delay under weight-based pricing is converted into airport revenue under 
congestion pricing. Congestion pricing recovers about $180 of delays per aircraft at Toronto, and $113 at 
Vancouver. Calgary and Montreal recover about $50 per aircraft. Columns nine and ten show the effects of 
completely replacing weight-based fees with congestion fees. Usually the airlines' costs go down more than 
airports' revenues, so the airports could make the switch to congestion pricing Pareto improving by 
retaining some of the revenues from weight-based fees. The final column show the daily welfare gains from 
congestion pricing of roughly $120,000 for Toronto, $50,000 for Vancouver, and $15,000 at Calgary and 
Montreal. These savings amount to twenty to thirty percent of the congestion fee revenues.
Table 2 presents results analogous to Table 1 for the alternative specification in which dominant 
airlines do internalize their self-imposed delays. In principle, either specification can result in larger 
welfare gains from congestion pricing, even though the unpriced internalizing specification has less 
uninternalized delay. Queuing time values depend on aircraft operating costs that are the same across 
specifications,  but  layover   delay  and   connection   time values   must  be  higher  in  the  internalizing 
specification to generate the same queuing levels when dominant airlines internalize. One or the other 
specification   generates   incorrect   estimates   of   time   values   and   equilibrium   traffic   patterns.   Which 
specification is correct may vary by airport. Both the unpriced baselines and priced equilibria traffic 
patterns are wrong for the incorrect specification. When comparing the dollar values across the two 
specifications in Tables 1 and 2, keep in mind that they do not use the same time values. 
Columns one and two of Table 2 show the weight-based and congestion fees for the specification 
with internalizing dominant airlines. In this specification, the primary role of congestion pricing is to price 
non-dominant aircraft out of the dominant airlines' flight banks that interchange passengers at hub airports. 
Congestion fees are typically lower for dominant airlines than for other major airlines. Unscheduled 
aircraft, however, are smaller on average and shift further toward the edges of the traffic peaks so they may 
impose less external delays than commercial airlines. Average congestion fees at Toronto are $481 for 
dominant aircraft and $1,022 for others; and at Vancouver, $385 for dominant aircraft and $734 for others. 
At Calgary and Montreal, dominant aircraft pay about $150 and other aircraft pay about $250 on average.
Columns three and four of Table 2 show the changes in time costs and fees per aircraft for the 
internalizing specification. The time costs exclude the indirect costs that dominant aircraft impose on each 
other because these costs are counted as direct cost of other dominant aircraft. At Toronto, the full landing 
and takeoff costs decrease from $5,524 to $2,273 for dominant aircraft, and from $6,313 to $2,806 for 
others; at Vancouver full costs decrease from $2,129 to $1643 for dominant aircraft, and increase from 
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dominant aircraft, and from $1,500 to $2,100 for others. An important policy concern is that the 
internalizing specification often leads to lower fees and higher benefits for dominant airlines relative to 
non-dominant airlines. While congestion pricing in the internalizing specification disproportionately 
benefits dominant airlines, it makes access to airports available on a more economically neutral basis. The 
current weight-based pricing system subsidizes non-dominant operations from dominant operations.
Columns five and six of Table 2 show the expected queue lengths for the unpriced and priced 
equilibria. With some exceptions, this specification has expected queues that are about the same in the 
unpriced case and somewhat higher in the priced case than the non-internalizing specification, so there is 
less reduction in queuing time as a result of pricing. Internalization of unpriced queuing delay flattens the 
peaks relative to non-internalizing equilibria, while the priced queues are more peaked because queuing is 
relatively less costly. Toronto's average queues decrease from about 3.2 to 2.6 minutes, and Vancouver's 
from about 4 to about 2.5 minutes. Calgary's and Montreal's average queuing decrease from about 2.5 to 
1.8. These differences are less than in the non-internalizing case. While queuing levels are modest, they 
increase significantly with projected growth in traffic over the next decade. The current low queuing levels, 
particularly for the congestion pricing cases suggest that the leading Canadian airports have excess 
capacities for current traffic levels.
Columns seven, eight, and nine of Table 2 report the welfare and revenue changes as a result of 
congestion pricing in the internalizing specification. Congestion pricing recovers over $260 of delays per 
aircraft at Toronto, and nearly $175 at Vancouver. Calgary and Montreal save about $90 per aircraft. Social 
savings per aircraft and airport as shown in columns seven and nine are roughly one and a half times those 
in the non-internalizing specification because layover and connection time values are higher. Annual social 
savings at all four airports is about one hundred five million dollars, compared with seventy-two million in 
the non-internalizing case. Annual airport revenues from congestion pricing total about two hundred 
seventy-six million dollars compared with three hundred ten million in the non-internalizing specification. 
The unequivocal conclusion is that substantial welfare gains result from congestion pricing under either 
specification.
To indicate the sensitivity of these results to differences in service rates, Table 3 reports service 
rate elasticities of the fees, time costs, delay times, and welfare effects that appear in Tables 1 and 2. Actual 
airport service rates vary depending on such factors as weather conditions, mix of landings and takeoffs, 
mix of aircraft types, and noise regulations. Each airport's master plan [1, 8, 17, 30] reports its service rate 
based on the maximal number of aircraft it can land and takeoff in an hour under balanced traffic 
conditions. Daniel and Harback [13] calibrate the stochastic queuing model to fit estimated queuing 
patterns by fine tuning the reported service rates of each airport. Based on their results, the stochastic 
queuing model is valid for a wide variety of airport queues, but reported service rates may be slightly 
higher than the best parameterizations of the stochastic queuing model, causing underestimates of delays. 
Canadian data for estimating airport queues by time of day is not publicly available, so the service rates 
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should provide reasonable approximations of changes in results over the range of uncertainty about service 
rates. 
Under congestion pricing with non internalizing behavior, the average fee, delay, time cost, and 
welfare gains generally decrease more than proportionately with increases in service rates. There are some 
anomalies among the unscheduled aircraft due to their small numbers, lower costs, greater shifting of 
operating times, and different operating time preferences. Under weight-based fees the direction of changes 
are usually the same, but the magnitude is usually smaller. Time and fee cost under weight-base pricing are 
especially insensitive to service rates because the large weight-based fee is fixed. For the internalizing case, 
the qualitative effects are similar to the above but the sensitivities of the results to the service rates are 
significantly smaller. It is plausible that the “true” service rate is as much as ten percent lower, meaning 
that the welfare gains from congestion pricing would be roughly fifteen percent higher in the non 
internalizing case or six percent higher in the internalizing case than reported above.
Table 4 shows the changes in fees, delays, costs, and welfare as traffic rates increase according to 
projections in the airports' master plans [1, 8, 17, 30]. Toronto projects thirty percent traffic growth by 2015 
and nearly fifty percent by 2020 relative to the base year 2008. Calgary projects twenty percent growth by 
2015 and thirty-four by 2020. Vancouver projects seventeen percent growth by 2015 and thirty-one by 
2020. Montreal projects sixteen percent growth by 2015 and twenty-six by 2020. These projections are 
slightly above the long run trend that Transport Canada's  Aircraft Movement Statistics,  identifies. 
According to the Master Plans, Toronto intends to add a sixth runway around 2014, taking its capacity from 
126 movements per hour to 140. Vancouver and Calgary plan additional parallel runways around 2020. The 
Master Plans do not include specific implementation schedules for the runway projects. Montreal 
apparently has no plans for additional runways within its current twenty year planning horizon, and it is not 
clear that the current site could accommodate an additional runway. The other airports will reach their sites' 
maximal capacities with the completion of one additional runway each. 
If its projected traffic materializes, Toronto's current modest level of delay will more than double 
by 2015 under the current pricing system without a new runway. The time costs per aircraft (not including 
the weight-based fee) would increase by approximately two-thirds to about $1500 ($3500 internalizing). 
This would qualify it as moderately congested relative to US airports on the basis of queuing time, and 
highly congested by time costs. It is understandable that the airport would seek additional capacity under 
these conditions. Under congestion pricing, however, time costs per aircraft would just reach the current 
level in 2014 (2012 internalizing). Average queuing time would remain below four minutes, and the 
congestion fees would be well below current weight-based fees on average. Moreover, if the unpriced 
congestion level for 2014 is the correct point at which to add capacity, the airport would not reach those 
levels until after 2020 under congestion pricing (2020 internalizing). Queuing delays would remain around 
five and a half minutes (six and a half internalizing), well within levels experienced at other major 
20international airports. Congestion fees would average more than the current weight-based fees, but not as 
high as current aeronautical revenues from landing fees and terminal charges.
Projected growth rates for Vancouver, Calgary, and Montreal are lower so that they never reach 
the extreme congestion level projected for Toronto in 2020. Vancouver's queuing time would reach just 
above 3 minutes (4 minutes internalizing) and its congestion fees would reach $840 ($1200 internalizing). 
In no case would Calgary or Montreal reach three minutes of delay or $400 congestion fees under 
congestion pricing before 2020. Vancouver would only reach its current cost per aircraft in 2023 (2015 
internalizing) under congestion pricing. Calgary and Montreal reach their current cost per aircraft in 2020 
(Calgary 2015 and Montreal 2013 internalizing) under congestion pricing.
These results show that in addition to reducing social cost under current traffic conditions, 
congestion pricing produces substantial gains by using existing capacity more efficiently and postponing 
capital expenditures on new runways.
Policy Implications and Conclusions
As a form of marginal cost pricing, congestion pricing is a first-best solution to airport congestion. 
Real world approaches may not achieve all possible efficiency gains due to political feasibility constraints, 
but it is useful to know what effects fully internalizing congestion would have on prices, delays, traffic 
patterns, revenues, and welfare.  The stochastic bottleneck model includes important features of airport 
delays that are largely absent from other airport congestion models. Modeling the trade off between 
layover, connection, and queuing delays is necessary to generate endogenous demand peaking caused by 
hub-and-spoke airlines. Accounting for changes in layover delays and connection times is also necessary to 
accurately quantify the effects of congestion pricing. Airlines and policymakers should consider these 
schedule delays along with queuing delays. The bottleneck model also has state-contingent queues, unlike 
many other airport congestion models in which delays are functions of contemporaneous traffic rates alone. 
Rapid fluctuations in traffic rates make airport queues highly dependent on the state (i.e., the pdf on 
lengths) of queues in addition to contemporaneous traffic rates. The bottleneck model allows (nearly) 
continuous-time variation in traffic rates, whereas most other airport congestion models aggregate traffic by 
hour or half hour. Models that use half-hourly traffic data for congestion pricing or slot allocation are 
simply inappropriate for most airports, as the traffic patterns in Figure 1 clearly illustrate. 
The   stochastic   bottleneck   model   estimates   congestion   prices   under   internalizing   or   non-
internalizing specifications, depending on what behavioral assumptions are made about the dominant and 
non-dominant airlines. The reader is free to adopt either set of results. Many researchers apparently believe 
that it is incorrect to model dominant airlines as “naively” ignoring their self-imposed congestion. On the 
other hand, assuming that dominant airlines internalize their self-imposed congestion implicitly assumes 
that they ignore other airlines’ behavioral responses to their scheduling changes. Empirical evidence on this 
point is mixed, suggesting that dominant airlines behave differently at different airports. Their behavior 
may be influenced by the number of other dominant airlines, the strength of their hub operations, the 
21amount of airport capacity, the presence of slot constraints, and the proportion of dominant to non-
dominant aircraft. 
Recently, various proposals for slot constraint systems have gained traction with researchers and 
policymakers. These new proposals involve slot auctions and slot markets rather than administered slot 
allocations similar to those of Toronto and European airports. The results in Tables 1 and 2 indicate that 
Toronto's slot constraints leave unrealized forty to sixty million dollars in annual welfare gains. The IATA's 
Worldwide   Scheduling   Guidelines  may   be   accurately,   if   uncharitably,   characterized   as   industry 
administered regulation of entry and exit explicitly designed to preserve incumbent airlines' private quasi-
property rights in public airports. New entrants may only obtain slots from new capacity or from slots 
forfeited due to disuse. Slots are not purchased or sold. Initial slot allocations are granted on the basis of 
historical use at the beginning of semiannual scheduling conferences. Nine hundred airline and airport 
representatives meet for three days to conduct bilateral negotiations for slot exchanges. It is difficult to 
know whether replacing this system with slot auctions and/or slot markets would reduce the transaction 
costs of allocating slots. The current system illustrates that airlines need to optimize complex combinations 
of slots to support their flight schedules. Combinatorial auction mechanisms for contingent bidding on 
bundles of slots may be even more costly than the IATA's approach. Aside from the problems of 
conducting the auction, the proposals also fail to address the problem of demand peaking within the slot 
windows. 
Proponents of slot auctions and markets argue that optimal congestion prices are difficult to set, 
whereas auctions and markets reveal the participants' valuations of slots. The difficulty of setting 
congestion prices is overstated. Given the expected arrival rates by time of day—obtained by averaging 
arrival rates by time period (minute) over a number of days—the Appendix provides analytical expressions 
for congestion fees that depend on parameters for: the airport's service rate; the value of layover, 
connection, and queuing time; and the preferred operating times. Airlines will adjust their aircraft operating 
times in response to fees. The economist needs to anticipate the equilibrium traffic patterns to predict what 
the congestion fee schedules and social gains will look like, but it is not necessary for the airport authority 
to compute the equilibrium to determine the external costs. The airport authority can simply use the 
observed traffic patterns that emerge in response to pricing as they slowly phase in congestion pricing. 
Congestion pricing avoids the administrative overhead of allocating slots. Airlines are free to fly anywhere 
at any time, provided they are willing to pay the fee and experience the delay. Markets will always clear as 
queues adjust to equilibrate supply and demand, just as they do currently at nearly every US airport. As 
congestion fees approach the full external costs as calculated in the stochastic queuing model, the traffic 
rate should approach the equilibrium pattern predicted by the bottleneck model, just as the current traffic 
rates follow the no-fee bottleneck equilibrium. If the model is imperfect, non-optimal queues will still 
equilibrate supply and demand, and the traffic rates will converge to a suboptimal pattern that probably will 
nevertheless enhance welfare. Pricing should be reevaluated shortly after implementation to look for 
inefficiencies. Many policy makers apparently dislike fee schedules that fluctuate rapidly and continuously. 
22This model and the empirical evidence on airport traffic patterns, however, suggests that the only real 
policy choice is between rapidly fluctuating congestion fees (that generate substantial revenues) or rapidly 
fluctuating queuing delays (with significant welfare losses).
Based on the specification tests in Daniel and Harback [12] and the welfare results presented in 
Tables 1, the author argues that there is a strong case for imposing non-internalizing fee structures as 
shown in the bottom panels of Figures 3 to 6 on aircraft operations at Toronto, Vancouver, Calgary and 
Montreal. For readers who believe the internalizing specification, Table 2 makes a strong case for imposing 
internalizing fee structures as shown in the bottom panels of Figures 7 to 10.
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24Appendix A
M(t)/d/s/K queuing systems have Poisson arrivals with time varying rates (lt arrivals per minute), 
deterministic service intervals (d  operations  per minute), multiple servers (s  parallel  runways), and 
maximum queue sizes (no more than K aircraft awaiting service). A state vector (qt) has elements, [q0t,, q1t,, 
q2t ,…, qkt], representing the probabilities of the queue having lengths 0, 1, 2,… K at time t. Let w(k) be the 
waiting time required for aircraft joining the queue when its length is k. Expected queuing cost at time t is 
the product of the probabilities, qkt, and the waiting time in the queue, w(k), summed over all k..  The 
expected direct queuing cost for an aircraft actually arriving during period t is Qt =S k=0
K qk,t w(k).
The most-preferred service-completion time of a dominant aircraft a is ta, the start or end of the 
passenger exchange period. The aircraft arriving for service at t when the queue is of length k actually 
completes service at time t+w(k). Layover time is the waiting time between the early service-completion 
time and the most-preferred service-completion time. If aircraft a completes service before ta, (i.e., t+w(k) 
£ ta) then its layover time is ta-t-w(k). Reduced connection time is the time between the most-preferred 
service-completion time and the late service-completion time. If an aircraft completes service after ta, then 
its connection time is reduced by t+w(k)-ta. To calculate expected layover and reduced-connection time at 
time t, simply weight layover and reduced-connection times by the probability qkt that the queue is of length 
k at time t and sum over the range of k for which aircraft are early or late. The direct layover time of aircraft 
actually joining queue at time t is Ct =S k=0
K qk,t max[0,ta-t-w(k)]. The direct reduced connection time of 
aircraft actually joining the queue at time t is Lt =S k=0
K  qk,t max[0, t+w(k)-ta].
The queuing system parameters (s, d, and K) and the time-varying traffic rates (lt) fully determine 
the transition matrices (Tt) for each service period:  
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Multiplying the state vector by the period’s transition matrix gives the next period’s state vector (qt+1=Tt qt). 
Iteratively multiplying the state vector by the transition matrices determines state of the queue in every 
subsequent period; i.e., qt+i= Tt+i Tt+i-1… Tt qt .
25Multiplying each period’s expected queue lengths by the probability that a given aircraft actually 
arrives during that period (from the distribution of actual about intended operating times st,i and summing 
over all the periods in which it potentially operates determines the expected direct queuing delay of an 
arrival scheduled at period t:
A.2 E[Qt ]= Si st,i S k=0
K qk,(t+i)w(k).
Similarly, the expected direct layover and reduced connection times of an arrival scheduled at period t are:
A.3 E[Lt ]= Si st,i S qk,(t+i) max[0,ta-(t+i)-w(k)].  
A.4 E[Ct ]= Si st,i  Sqk,t+i max[0, (t+i)+w(k)-ta] 
The marginal effect of a current arrival on queuing in the next period is determined by pre-
multiplying the state vector qt  by a transition matrix Dt obtained by differentiating the current queuing 
transition matrix, Tt, element by element with respect to the current arrival rate; i.e., d t,t+1 = Dt qt  where: 
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The vector d t,t+1 gives the rate of change in probabilities that the queue is of lengths 0 to k in the next 
period with respect to the current arrival rate,  lt. Iteratively multiplying this vector by the transition 
matrices determines the vectors that specify the marginal changes in the probability distributions on queue 
lengths for all subsequent periods (d t,t+i=Tt+i Tt+i-1 … Tt+1Dt qt). 
Let the set A contain the intended operating times ta of all aircraft, and the set H contain only the 
intended operating times th of non dominant airlines’ aircraft.  The   expected   marginal   external   queuing 
delay that an aircraft intended to operate at time ta imposes on an aircraft intended to arrive at period tx is 
Si stx,i Sk=0
K dk,ta,tx+i w(k). Summing over all aircraft operating times in sets A or H determines the expected 
marginal queuing delay that an actual arrival at period t imposes externally, Q'ta=SxєX Si stx,i Sk=0
K dk,ta,tx+i w(k), 
where the set X represents either A or H. Similarly, the expected marginal layover and reduced connection 
times   that   an   actual   arrival   at   period  ta  imposes  externally   are 
L'ta=SxєX Si stx,i Sk=0
K dk,ta,tx+i max[0, ta-(tx+i)-w(k)], and C'ta=SxєX Si stx,i Sk=0
K dk,ta,tx+i max[0, (t+i)+w(k)-ta].
26The expected marginal external queuing delays for aircraft intended to operate at time t is the sum 
of the probabilities of actually arriving in periods st.,i times these expected marginal delays at time t.+i :
A.6 E[Q'ta]=Si sta,ta+i SxєX Si stx,i Sk=0
K dk,t,tx+i w(k)
A.7 E[L'ta]=Si sta,ta+i SxєX Si stx,i Sk=0
K dk,t,tx+i max[0, ta-(tx+i)-w(k)], and 
A.8 E[C'ta]=Si sta,ta+i SxєX Si stx,i Sk=0
K dk,t,tx+i max[0, (t+i)+w(k)-ta].
Note that all these calculations give exact analytical expressions for marginal delay times, and their 
derivations are independently verifiable under the assumptions of the model. The values of these 
expressions, however, depend on the endogenous values of the intended operating times ta of all aircraft. 
The bottleneck equilibria are Nash equilibria in which the players are individual airlines denoted 
by elements n in the set of all airlines N; the strategies are scalars or vectors of intended operating times 
tn=[t1, t2, …,tmm] where mn1 is the number of aircraft operated by airline n; and each  tn is a best response 
that minimizes the airline's total operating costs subject to the schedule choices  to of all the other airlines 
oN. The best responses depend on the behavioral assumptions about internalization and whatever fee 
schedule the airport imposes. Let vQ, vC, and vL denote the value of queuing, connection, and layover times. 
 
A fully atomistic, no-fee bottleneck equilibrium has airlines choosing schedule times that 
minimize direct aircraft costs:
A.9 tj =arg min {vQ E[Qtj ]+vC E[Ctj]+vL E[Ltj]},  tj tn and nN and given all tk to, where oN.
A fully atomistic, priced bottleneck equilibrium has airlines choosing schedule times that 
minimize the sum of direct aircraft costs plus the fee F[tj ; tj]=vQ E[Q'tj ]+vC E[C'tj]+vL E[L'tj]:
A.10 tj =arg min {vQ E[Qtj ]+vC E[Ctj]+vL E[Ltj]+F[tj ; tj]}, 
 tj tn and nN and given all tk to, where oN.
A dominant-non dominant, no-fee bottleneck equilibrium has dominant airlines choosing schedule 
times that minimize the sum of direct and indirect costs of its own aircraft:
A.11 tj =arg min {vQ E[Qtj ]+vC E[Ctj]+vL E[Ltj]+vQ E[Q'tj ]+vC E[C'tj]+vL E[L'tj], 
tj tn and nN and given all tk to, where oN;
and non dominant airlines choose their tj.as specified in A.9.
A dominant-non dominant, ideally priced bottleneck equilibrium has dominant airlines choosing 
schedule times that minimize the sum of direct and indirect costs of its own aircraft plus the fee that 
includes the indirect costs imposed on other airlines' aircraft, F[tj;tj]=vQE[Q'tj]+vCE[C'tj]+vL E[L'tj],:
A.12 tj =arg min {vQ E[Qtj ]+vC E[Ctj]+vL E[Ltj]+vQ E[Q'tj ]+vC E[C'tj]+vL E[L'tj]+F[tj;tj], 
tj tn and nN and given all tk to, where oN;
and non dominant airlines choose their tj. as specified in A.9.
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2 Toronto follows the International Air Transit Association's (IATA) Worldwide Scheduling Guidelines 
(WSG) [19] for allocating slots. The basic principles of the WSG provide for allocation based on historical 
usage subject to use-it-or-lose-it rules, allocation of a fraction of new or unused slots to new entrants, and 
bilateral one-for-one trading of existing slots. The guidelines call for flexibility in permitting deviations of 
actual operating times from slot times and do not specify penalties for excessive deviations other than 
possibly losing the slot. 
3 Daniel and Harback [12] found similar peaking at slot controlled airports in the U.S.
4  These values for layover and connection time for arrivals and departures are 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, and 0.0 
repectively. 
5 Similar graphs for the departures are shown in Tables A.1 and A.2 of the appendix. The equilibria include 
unscheduled traffic, but these graphs only include scheduled traffic for direct comparison with scheduled 
data. The scheduled traffic is distributed around the schedule time using the distribution of actual arrivals 
around mean operating times from MSP airport. The traffic patterns are not very sensitive to the observed 
variations in these distributions among US airports.
6 In 2005-2006 it was the highest in the world. Air Transport Research Society, The ATRS Global Airport 
Benchmarking Report 2005 [2].
7  Management’s discussion and analysis and Consolidated Financial Statements of the GREATER 
TORONTO AIRPORTS AUTHORITY December 31, 2007, pp. 7, 10. 
8 VANCOUVER AIRPORT AUTHORITY, TARIFF OF FEES AND CHARGES, effective January 1, 2008.
9 The Calgary Airport Authority, TARIFF OF AVIATION FEES, as at January 1, 2007.
10 Landing fee revenues from Aeroports de Montreal Annual Report 2007 [1], Management’s discussion 
and analysis for the year ended December 31, 2007, p. 27. MTOW estimated from Transport Canada’s, 
Aircraft Movement Statistics2005, p. 27 [29]







































Air Canada & Jazz 364 104 $3,484 $892 $4,335 $1,570 3.96 2.36 $172 -$1,006,407 -$943,661
Other Scheduled 262 125 $4,206 $868 $5,349 $1,800 2.88 2.30 $211 -$929,959 -$874,693
Unscheduled 30 12 $406 $504 $499 $598 3.06 1.81 -$1 $2,975 $2,947
Vancouver $50,226
Air Canada 166 100 $486 $460 $1,117 $933 3.83 2.09 $157 -$30,444 -$4,365
Other Other Scheduled 164 100 $486 $455 $1,106 $922 3.80 2.09 $153 -$30,154 -$5,111
Unscheduled commercial 92 25 $103 $184 $229 $313 2.21 1.76 -$2 $7,674 $7,499
Unscheduled private 24 10 $32 $152 $87 $237 2.30 1.75 -$30 $3,593 $2,872
Calgary $15,066
Air Canada & Jazz 113 80 $463 $222 $802 $477 2.90 1.60 $84 -$36,678 -$27,176
Westjet 74 68 $392 $193 $663 $411 2.70 1.59 $52 -$18,602 -$14,746
Other Scheduled 45 125 $923 $184 $1,415 $602 2.05 1.47 $75 -$36,601 -$33,226
Unscheduled commercial 45 25 $119 $95 $218 $213 1.87 1.35 -$20 -$202 -$1,088
Unscheduled private 36 10 $41 $63 $81 $124 1.86 1.29 -$21 $1,570 $790
Montreal $14,495
Air Canada & Jazz 110 83 $1,073 $265 $1,418 $526 3.07 1.72 $84 -$98,157 -$88,867
Other Scheduled 99 125 $1,625 $210 $2,104 $636 1.91 1.53 $53 -$145,321 -$140,116
Unscheduled commercial 47 25 $325 $125 $421 $219 1.82 1.39 $3 -$9,421 -$9,299

































Air Canada & Jazz $3,484 $481 $5,524 $2,273 3.25 2.76 $248 -$1,183,341 -$1,093,156
Other Scheduled $4,206 $1,022 $6,313 $2,806 3.09 2.54 $323 -$918,776 -$834,230
Unscheduled $406 $457 $548 $750 3.08 1.83 -$150 $6,060 $1,547
Vancouver $72,769
Air Canada $486 $385 $2,129 $1,643 3.58 2.80 $385 -$80,648 -$16,711
Other Other Scheduled $486 $734 $1,443 $1,591 5.17 2.76 $100 $24,185 $40,647
Unscheduled commercial $103 $185 $353 $494 2.99 1.86 -$58 $12,352 $7,268
Unscheduled private $32 $139 $132 $337 3.22 1.75 -$98 $5,327 $2,782
Calgary $20,971
Air Canada & Jazz $463 $131 $1,148 $696 2.73 2.00 $121 -$51,044 -$37,428
Westjet $392 $145 $907 $586 2.92 2.00 $73 -$23,721 -$18,322
Other Scheduled $923 $232 $1,703 $917 2.39 1.73 $96 -$35,372 -$31,065
Unscheduled commercial $119 $115 $279 $294 2.11 1.47 -$19 $644 -$202
Unscheduled private $41 $61 $105 $167 2.09 1.23 -$42 $2,226 $719
Montreal $22,690
Air Canada & Jazz $1,073 $166 $1,847 $805 2.93 2.21 $134 -$114,519 -$99,832
Other Scheduled $1,625 $252 $2,478 $1,018 2.23 1.75 $87 -$144,516 -$135,893
Unscheduled commercial $325 $146 $498 $312 2.10 1.60 $7 -$8,550 -$8,215






















Air Canada & Jazz -2.88 -1.16 -1.62 -0.17 -2.14 -0.41
Other Scheduled -3.21 -1.93 -1.84 -0.07 -1.69 -2.77
Unscheduled -3.73 -1.67 -2.07 -0.16 -2.89 -10.15
Vancouver -1.24
Air Canada -2.28 -0.92 -1.35 -0.33 -1.45 -0.90
Other Other Scheduled -2.23 -0.94 -1.35 -0.34 -1.43 -0.95
Unscheduled commercial -3.50 -1.65 -2.17 -0.24 -2.21 -11.36
Unscheduled private -4.26 -1.74 -2.46 -0.33 -2.82 28.89
Calgary -1.37
Air Canada & Jazz -1.41 -0.75 -0.91 -0.21 -0.87 -0.87
Westjet -1.32 -0.84 -0.88 -0.21 -0.83 -1.10
Other Scheduled -1.69 -1.19 -1.09 -0.05 -0.53 -1.26
Unscheduled commercial -2.36 -1.31 -1.77 -0.02 -1.10 1.97
Unscheduled private -2.89 -1.35 -1.65 -0.07 -1.13 9.54
Montreal -1.34
Air Canada & Jazz -1.91 -0.83 -1.11 -0.12 -1.21 -0.83
Other Scheduled -2.19 -1.54 -1.38 0.01 -0.69 -1.62
Unscheduled commercial -2.34 -1.46 -1.75 0.03 -1.38 -4.42
Unscheduled private -2.56 -1.71 -1.86 -0.02 0.14 -64.22





















Air Canada & Jazz -1.21 -0.61 -0.65 -0.18 -0.61 -0.78
Other Scheduled -1.32 -0.89 -0.94 0.01 -0.46 -0.41
Unscheduled -1.66 -0.96 -1.17 0.01 -0.68 3.10
Vancouver -0.51
Air Canada -0.56 -0.30 -0.37 -0.17 -0.28 -0.30
Other Other Scheduled -0.49 -0.31 -0.35 -0.08 -0.27 -0.54
Unscheduled commercial -1.53 -0.73 -1.31 0.08 -0.45 1.43
Unscheduled private -1.39 -0.69 -1.32 0.02 -0.25 1.61
Calgary -0.39
Air Canada & Jazz -0.49 -0.26 -0.26 -0.11 -0.18 -0.50
Westjet -0.61 -0.52 -0.39 -0.14 -0.27 -0.75
Other Scheduled -0.66 -0.65 -0.47 0.04 -0.13 0.32
Unscheduled commercial -0.77 -0.68 -0.78 0.09 -0.41 -2.23
Unscheduled private -1.39 -0.74 -1.29 0.07 -0.41 0.51
Montreal -0.80
Air Canada & Jazz -0.75 -0.56 -0.34 -0.13 -0.29 -0.92
Other Scheduled -0.93 -0.92 -0.65 0.07 -0.03 -0.64
Unscheduled commercial -0.65 -0.87 -0.52 0.08 -0.36 26.80
Unscheduled private -1.17 -1.03 -0.99 0.07 -0.31 1.83





































Toronto 2008 656 864 3.5 2.3 933 753 180 567,103 117,984
1.30 2015 823 2,579 7.1 4.0 1,511 1,064 447 2,199,373 381,354
1.49 2020 931 4,663 12.7 5.3 2,428 1,341 1,086 4,557,699 1,061,816
Vancouver 2008 446 385 3.4 2.0 492 379 113 171,506 50,226
1.17 2015 500 532 4.3 2.4 609 457 152 277,796 79,314
1.31 2020 548 840 5.8 3.1 779 526 253 490,836 147,794
Calgary 2008 314 173 2.5 1.5 276 227 48 54,274 15,066
1.20 2015 356 253 3.4 1.9 348 271 77 95,187 28,958
1.34 2020 388 330 3.9 2.3 399 302 97 138,839 40,618
Montreal 2008 285 206 2.3 1.6 319 271 48 58,859 13,654
1.16 2015 316 279 2.9 1.8 370 310 60 92,242 19,764





































Toronto 2008 656 696 3.2 2.6 1,980 1,720 259 456,671 170,218
1.30 2015 836 2,476 5.9 4.3 3,472 2,217 1,255 2,111,648 1,070,564
1.49 2020 944 5,437 9.3 6.4 5,769 3,170 2,599 5,314,538 2,540,466
Vancouver 2008 444 460 4.0 2.5 1,024 860 164 204,246 72,769
1.17 2015 512 677 5.0 3.2 1,253 1,018 235 351,563 122,045
1.31 2020 586 1,188 6.6 4.3 1,596 1,215 380 691,167 221,208
Calgary 2008 313 139 2.6 1.8 512 445 67 43,382 20,971
1.20 2015 369 208 3.3 2.2 624 523 101 78,287 37,952
1.34 2020 422 271 3.7 2.6 692 564 128 113,493 53,488
Montreal 2008 285 185 2.5 1.9 630 550 80 52,758 22,690
1.16 2015 320 258 3.0 2.2 722 618 104 85,314 34,400
1.26 2020 370 375 3.7 2.7 804 661 143 134,599 51,274Figure 1--Comparison of Scheduled Arrivals and Modelled Non Internalizing Arrivals































































































































































































eFigure 2--Comparison of Scheduled Arrivals and Modelled Internalizing Arrivals































































































































































































eFigure 3--Non Internalizing Toronto Model, Unpriced and Priced Arrivals, Delays, and Congestion










































































































































nFigure 4--Non Internalizing Vancouver Model, Unpriced and Priced Arrivals, Delays, and Congestion


































































































































yFigure 5--Non Internalizing Calgary Model, Unpriced and Priced Arrivals, Delays, and Congestion





































































































































yFigure 6--Non Internalizing Montreal Model, Unpriced and Priced Arrivals, Delays, and Congestion




































































































































nFigure 7--Internalizing Toronto Model, Unpriced and Priced Arrivals, Delays, and Congestion










































































































































nFigure 8--Internalizing Vancouver Model, Unpriced and Priced Arrivals, Delays, and Congestion









































































































































nFigure 9--Internalizing Calgary Model, Unpriced and Priced Arrivals, Delays, and Congestion








































































































































nFigure 10--Internalizing Montreal Model, Unpriced and Priced Arrivals, Delays, and Congestion





































































































































nFigure A.1--Comparison of Scheduled Departures and Modelled Non Internalizing Departures




























































































































































































eFigure A.2--Comparison of Scheduled Departures and Modelled Internalizing Departures
















































































































































Montreal Scheduled Departures, Actual v Internalizing Model
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